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News Analysis: The French Way of War
Jan 19th 2013, 16:53

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Soldiers from the French Foreign Legion rehearsing in July for the Bastille Day parade down the Champs-Élysées.

PARIS

IN 1966, the French president, Charles de Gaulle, war hero and general nuisance in Allied eyes, wrote President Lyndon B. Johnson to announce that France was pulling out of full membership in NATO and would expel NATO headquarters from France.

"France is determined to regain on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty, at present diminished by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the use which is made of her airspace; to cease her participation in the integrated commands; and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of NATO," de Gaulle wrote.

After the humiliating capitulation to the Nazis, a tremendous shock to a prideful and martial France, it was not especially surprising that de Gaulle should seek to restore France to a place at the top table of nations, capable of defending its own interests with its own means at its own pace and pleasure.

Even today, as French troops intervene in Mali, the French take pride in their military capacity and in their independence of action. French forces still march every year down the Champs-Élysées on Bastille Day, a military celebration unparalleled in the West. France has nuclear weapons and is the only country, other than the United States, with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. And even as Paris has slowly reconciled itself to full NATO membership, France has maintained its ability to send troops and equipment quickly to large parts of the globe, and it should soon overtake an austerity-minded Britain as the world's fourth largest military spender, after the United States, China and Russia.

"The French, who are so gloomy and pessimistic about the situation in the country and the economy, have at least one reason to be proud of what their country can achieve," Jean-David Levitte, the diplomatic adviser to former President Nicolas Sarkozy and the former ambassador to both the United States and the United Nations, told me. "We still have a foreign policy, a capacity to act beyond our borders, a capacity to make a difference."

France cannot do everything on its own, Mr. Levitte freely acknowledges. "But if you don't have the military means to act, you don't have a foreign policy," he said.

The French are willing to intervene militarily, but on the basis of new conditions, which differ, French officials argue, from the old colonial habits and traditions known as "Françafrique."

In Mali, as they did in 2011 in Libya and in Ivory Coast, the French have intervened on the basis of a direct request for help from a legitimate government, the support of regional African groupings like the African Union and a resolution from the United Nations Security Council.

Even in Mali, France means to act multilaterally, even if it is leading from the front, as it did in Libya, in the name of saving an ally and helping the Sahel region combat the spread of radical Islamists, some of them foreign jihadists, strongly connected to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

So far, the decisive intervention by the French president, François Hollande, has been popular. A survey published on Wednesday by BVA for Le Parisien found that 75 percent of the French supported Mr. Hollande's decision to take rapid military action against Islamist rebels in Mali, despite the risks, compared with 66 percent support for intervention in Libya last year and 55 percent for Afghanistan in 2001. An earlier poll on Monday for IFOP found that 63 percent backed Mr. Hollande's decision.

More striking, perhaps, the consensus among the political elite has been unanimously supportive, says Bruno Tertrais, a defense analyst at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. "The French people are ready to support a military operation as long as the objectives are clear and seem legitimate," he told me. While stopping the Islamist advance on Bamako, Mali's capital, is such a goal, he went on to say, "if it were a matter of an operation to reconquer the north of Mali, the perception would have been different."

The French have an all-volunteer military, which distances the population further from the cost of war and makes soldiers "less visible to the populace at large," notes Sébastien Jakubowski, a sociologist at the University of Lille who studies the army. It has also made the army more popular, with an approval rating of between 80 and 90 percent, he says.

But in another change from the past, the French expect that a decision to use the military will be based on clear moral criteria, Mr. Jakubowski said. And the French take some pride in playing a leading role from a moral foundation, even if French national interests are also at play, pushing other allies to act.

Mr. Jakubowski cited an interview in Le Figaro on Jan. 3 with the American neoconservative historian Robert Kagan, whose study of American and European attitudes toward the use of force, comparing America to Mars and Europe to Venus, was much caricatured but highly influential.

In the interview, and later to me, Mr. Kagan praised the French for their willingness to use force in the pursuit of legitimate goals, even if they may not always have sufficient means to accomplish them. "Nobody asks France to be at the forefront of military interventions, but the willingness of the French to take the initiative is positive," he said. "I have a new philosophy: If the French are ready to go, we should go."

But the French also understand that their military limitations are real, and they are far better off acting with others, even if not always with Washington. Paris has been a constant prod to other European countries, and to the European Union itself, to develop better military capacities.

"We think it is absolutely necessary for other European countries to do what we do," Mr. Levitte said. "Otherwise there will be a kind of strategic irrelevance of Europe as a whole." It should be obvious, he said, that the United States has other priorities and is concentrating on Asia, and need not act everywhere. "So if we are both independent and true allies of the United States we should be in a position to act when need be."

Steven Erlanger is the Paris bureau chief of The New York Times.

A version of this news analysis appeared in print on January 20, 2013, on page SR5 of the National edition with the headline: The French Way of War.

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